In poem 64 Catullus, as Fordyce points out in his edition , often has lines enclosed by a noun and its adjective, e.g.: 5 auratam optantes Colchis avertere pellem Very often, but not always, a syntactical unit is enclosed as well as the line. This is perhaps not surprising, considering the prevalence of punctuation at the end of the line in this poem. Nevertheless, an examination of the lines will show that when a noun and adjective1 enclose both line and (...) syntactical unit the fact that they enclose a syntactical unit can be regarded as a determinant of the word order. (shrink)

To what extent does the fact that a philosopher, in order to communicate, is constrained to use the same language and the same concepts as other members of his society, inhibit him from developing genuinely original modes of thought? Section I of this paper outlines arguments for the view that any attempt at radical originality, of the kinds traditionally expected of philosophy, must involve misuse of these shared concepts. Section II, however, on the basis of an examination of what it (...) is for different members of a society to use the same concepts, argues that so doing does not rule out important differences over instantiations and logical interrelations. It then attempts to show that this latitude for difference is adequate to allow for certain kinds of philosophical originality, for example, that shown in the Whiteheadian philosophy of organism. (shrink)

Of the capital manuscripts R and V have nexantem, M and P nixantem. The good minuscules favour nexantem on the whole, though Paris lat. 7906 has nixantem. nexantem is found in the Latin grammarians , v. 485 ), who quote the line because it contains this verb in its first conjugation form. Editors vary, and recently R. D. Williams, in his commentary on A. 5 , has preferred nixantem. So it seems worth restating the case for nexantem, especially as its (...) defenders have not used all the arguments open to them. (shrink)

Vitruvius has something interesting to say at De architectura 2.8.8: Non enim quae sunt e molli caemento subtili facie venustatis, non eae possunt esse in vetustate non ruinosae. itaque cum arbitrio communium parietum sumuntur, non aestimant eos quanti facti fuerint, sed cum ex tabulis inveniunt eorum locationes, pretia praeteritorum annorum singulorum deducunt octogesimas et ita – ex reliqua summa parte reddi pro his parietibus – sententiam pronuntiant eos non posse plus quam annos LXXX durare.Those structures made of soft rubble, for (...) all their subtle attractiveness, are not the ones that will resist ruin as time passes. And thus when assessors are appointed to evaluate party walls, they never assess soft rubble walls according to their initial cost, but rather, when they look at the price recorded in the original contracts, they deduct 1/80th of that sum for each subsequent year, and the remaining amount is fixed as the current value of the walls. They have rendered judgement, in effect, that such walls cannot last more than 80 years.By contrast, mud-brick walls were not depreciated at all if they were standing when assessed. The calculation performed for concrete walls demonstrates clear understanding of what we call ‘depreciation’ or ‘amortization’ in ancient Roman thought. It appears to have been overlooked to date. (shrink)

I Agree with R. G. Austin, who in his recent paper, 107 ff.) showed that Virgil did not write this proem to the Aeneid, and suggested that it was produced in the first half of the first century, perhaps prompted by the problem mentioned by Servius on A. I. I: ‘multi varie disserunt cur ab armis Vergilius coeperit.’ I wish here to comment briefly on the content of the lines. graciliqui... carmen refers to the writing of the Eclogues. As Austin (...) points out, Virgil has gracilis only in E. 10. 70 ff., the conclusion of the whole of the Eclogues:Haec sat erit, divae, vestrum cecinisse poetam,dum sedet et gracili fiscellam texit hibisco,Pierides…. (shrink)

Berkeley belonged to the days when it was possible to write philosophy without being learned, when it was sufficient to have fundamental convictions and to be able to write about them clearly. His contribution to the stock of philosophical possibilities was substantially complete when he was twenty-five, at which age no man can or should be learned. Not until he became a bishop did he pile up the burden of scholarship, and the work in which he expressed it, the Siris, (...) has remained a stumbling-block to his expositors. In his day philosophy was not learning but culture and wisdom. He. (shrink)

Catalepton 10 is a unique survival from antiquity: it is the only parody of an entire poem to reach us, and is written in pure iambic trimeters, a near intractable metre. Addressed to Sabinus, an upstart muleteer, the poem launches a stinging attack at him, and draws attention to his status as a parvenu. It remains incredibly close to its charming model—Catullus 4 —in structural, lexical, stylistic and metrical terms, but rather different in purport. In attempting to reassess a number (...) of problems in the text of the poem, the textual critic ought largely to be guided by the relationship of Sabinus ille to its model, as it is clear that the author of Catalepton 10 was an incredibly close reader of the Catullan text and sought not only to imitate through parody but also to subvert and deflate his predecessor's poem. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the significance of the irrational in education processes and to the role of teacher as an actor of psychological influence on the formation of child’s personality. Unfortunately, teacher education programs at universities do not properly introduce to the students all the aspects (including unconscious ones) of the interaction between people, in particular in the “teacher – student” system. At the same time, in the pedagogical literature there are no special works related to this issue. Psychological (...) theories and methods of education, which are designed to form and develop a personality, can simply destroy the necessary qualities in a child that lead to his independence and self-affirmation. Teachers who are incompetent in pedagogical issues often defend themselves by appealing to the well-known names of scientists and their theories. The theories should not become a dogma and a main path in education. They should serve as an auxiliary instrument. The theory of education is obliged to revise the content and form of the organization of educational process in accordance with the understanding and sense of the rhythm of the New World, taking into account the integration of educational concepts that provide a balance of the rational and irrational in the cognitive activity of a student. This balance is necessary for the full and comprehensive development of child’s personality, for the formation of his/her identity. The author of the article believes that under the conditions of large-scale simulacrization, virtualization, digitalization of the educational space, it is necessary to strengthen the emotional component of the educational process to avoid the final elimination of the aura (W. Benjamin) of the class area from the sphere of human relations in the “teacher – student – teacher” system. (shrink)

Solon's fragments 9–11 are preserved in three late authors: frr. 9 and 11 by Diodoros Sikelos , 9.20.2, Plutarch , Solon 3.6 and 30.3 respectively, and Diogenes Laertios , 1.50 and 1.51 respectively; and fr. 10 by Diogenes Laertios alone, 1.49. They are all quoted in the context of Solon's reaction to Peisistratos. Stories on this theme were circulating by the time of the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia , and Rhodes' scepticism about them is well founded. Its author did not garnish (...) his version of events with these poems, nor indeed with any Solonian utterance, and he explicitly states that myth-making on this subject had already resulted in two stories about Solon and Peisistratos which were chronologically impossible. (shrink)

Upon first reading this work, and without knowing its author, one may doubt its philosophical significance. Whereas philosophy implies wakefulness, the Reveries denotes dreams, "a shapeless diary" of the movements of the author’s soul. Often perceived as the product of Rousseau’s disturbed last years, seldom has it been used for interpreting his better known writings. It may therefore seem not surprising that two centuries should have passed before a scholarly English translation of high quality would appear, one that is indeed (...) prepared by a translator thoroughly grounded both in the tradition of Western philosophy and in the thought of Rousseau. Yet appearances notwithstanding, Charles Butterworth appends to his excellent translation an elaborate interpretative essay to justify the view that Rousseau’s last writing represents an ordered view that is not only philosophically interesting, but also reveals the basis of his paradoxical thought. (shrink)

Although this is a work of biography rather than of philosophy, in presenting the life of a philosopher like de Tracy a good deal of attention is necessarily paid to presenting his thought. The author provides extensive discussions of the five volumes of the Elements d’ideologie, including the Grammaire, the Logique, and the Traité de la volonté et de ses effets. In addition, he describes how de Tracy developed his science to apply to political economy, morals, and politics. In both (...) cases the author seeks to show how de Tracy’s thought takes its bearings from his experiences in revolutionary France and from his readings of Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire. While preserving the materialist presuppositions of these antecedents, de Tracy’s originality, according to Kennedy, lies in applying their materialism to a novel theory of movement. Further, in applying this theory of movement to human things, de Tracy prepares for the modern historical interpretation of ideology. Unfortunately, the author does not elaborate what precisely distinguishes de Tracy’s theory of movement from similar theories in the Epicurean tradition which he follows. Further, he does not explain how de Tracy’s application of this theory of movement to history, at the same time as Hegel, affects the historical interpretation of "ideology" in a way that differs from Hegel and that yet explains the evolution of the concept of "ideology." We may conjecture that de Tracy’s incipient philosophy of history adumbrates later materialist theories of historical development as encountered in Comte, whom he inspired, or in John Stuart Mill, who as a young man had been acquainted with de Tracy. But this does not distinguish "the ideologue" from Voltaire, who is often credited with originating the philosophy of history and who was a source of de Tracy’s thought in so many other respects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 265 concluding chapter (pp. 150-52), Dr. Clair deals with "Comment lire l'oeuvre du P. Thomassin," providing much guidance to anyone who wishes to avail himself of the rich resources in Thomassin's writings. From the point of view of the history of philosophy, the most interesting aspects of Thomassin's thought seem to be (1) his "Cartesianism," that is, the extent to which he early imbibed Descartes' new ideas, (...) and played a role in the fusion of the views of Augustine, B6rulle, and Descartes that developed in the Oratory, (2) his attempt to find a viable theory of the nature of Grace somewhere between Arnauld and Malebranche, and (3) his efforts to formulate a philosophy of history within an Augustinian theology; a philosophy of history that would make historical research and understanding of genuine philosophical and religious value to man. Dr. Clair's too brief discussions indicate that Thomassin was definitely influenced by reading Descartes, but also that Thomassin was much too eclectic to be a Cartesian. With regard to the problem of Grace, where the Cartesian Arnauld fought with the semi-Cartesian Malebranche, Thomassin tried deftly to maintain an Augustinian position that was not quite as rigid as that of the Jansenists, nor as moderate as that of Malebranche (though Arnauld tried to use Thomassin's erudition and authority in his battles with Malebranche). Unfortunately Dr. Clair does not try to evaluate whether Thomassin really found a coherent and theologically acceptable middle-ground between the two antagonists. On the subject of the philosophy of history, Thomassin's views seem most interesting (at least to this reviewer). The short text that Dr. Clair includes on the difference of history from science reveals Thomassin trying to show that the investigation and comprehension of temporal particulars can have significant value for man's understanding of man and that there can be genuine certainty about past facts. Thomassin was writing in the period when modern historical method and outlook were born, when historical study changed from chronicles and ammunition in theological and political disputes to a basic way of understanding human nature. Those concerned with the role of Bayle, Hume, Gibbon, and Vico in developing an historical methodology and a rationale for art historical approach to human problems might well profit from considering Thomassin's writings in this area, and the influence they had on modern historiography and philosophies of history. Dr. Clair's short work certainly helps in filling a lacuna in our picture of the seventeenth century. It also makes one wish he had done more, and had provided a "complete" study of Thomassin's thought and influence. That, perhaps, is one of the major purposes of this new series, in that it will lead scholars to looking into the more hidden portions of the period, and will lead them to filling out in more detail and depth the history of the rise and fall of modern philosophy. It is to be hoped that future volumes in this series will continue to whet our appetites for further investigations, and will transform more of the names we run across into figures about whom we have some information and from whom we can still learn something. RICHARD H. POPKIN University of California, San Diego Berkeley's Theory of Vision..4 Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. By D. M. Armstrong. (Melbourne: University Press; London and N. Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. viii + 106. $4.50). Berkeley's brilliant though disconcerting Essay has been rather neglected for some time, except for the able studies of C. M. Turbayne of Rochester University (N. Y.). Armstrong's book is welcome for that reason, also for its freshness, clearness, and rich brevity. A1- 266 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY though a slim volume, it is packed with close yet lucid argumentation, conducted throughout with good manners, and throughout exploratory, clarifying problems, exposing logical and empirical difficulties, not grandly telling us what the truth is but leaving us in a better position to carry on the exploration ourselves. It is an exemplary piece of philosophical discussion. He clears his ground by noting that the Essay, so far as... (shrink)

The following notes on the In Pisonem are largely based on the commentary of R. G. M. Nisbet . The references to the speech are by section and line of his text, and where my note is based on one of his I add a reference to the page of his commentary. 1. 20 voltus …, qui sermo quidam tacitus mentis est: ‘thoughts are usually revealed by the face.’ Add to Otto's, Seyffert-Muller's, and N.'s examples: Curtius 8. 6. 22 ‘voltus (...) haud sane securi animi index’, Juv. 9. 18 ff. (shrink)

Aristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that the akrates is typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure to convert (...) intention into action. Any solution must involve a recognition that we are dealing with a range of very different kinds of case, which demand different kinds of treatment. For example sometimes agents are overtaken by passion; sometimes they coolly and calmly do the wrong thing; sometimes they are insincere; sometimes they are suffering from a weakness of will; sometimes they are guilty of some kind of self deception; and sometimes they may have difficulty in comparing the goods and evils available. (shrink)

A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias. “The most utopian thing in Utopia is that there are no schools,” writes John Dewey. With these words, Dewey opened his talk to kindergarten teachers on April 21, 1933 at Teachers (...) College, Columbia University. Published a couple days later in the New York Times under the title, “Dewey Outlines Utopian Schools,” we find Dewey in this little-discussed talk fancifully imagining himself among the Utopians—somehow.. (shrink)

David Lewis has complained about the truthmaker theory as a version of the correspondence theory of truth (Lewis 2001a; Lewis 2001b). His main criticism is that the truthmaker theory, if combined with the redundancy theory, is not a theory about truth, but only »about the existential grounding of all manner of other things: the flying of pigs, or what-have-you« (Lewis 2001a: 279; Lewis 2001b: 603-4). In his view, to call such a truthmaker theory a theory of truth is a »misnomer« (...) (Lewis 2001a: 279). Lewis does not claim that the truthmaker theory is false, nor does he reject it. Indeed, he expresses agreement with its spirit. But of course it would be an embarrassment to any defender of the truthmaker theory to find out that it is not about truth at all. Indeed, if it were not about truth we should »forget about the ´correspondence theory of truth´«, as the title of Lewis´ paper suggests. Therefore, it is highly desirable for any adherent of the truthmaker theory to look for an understanding of the truthmaker theory which will let it be about truth, and to see whether anything of what Lewis has said provides an argument against it. We will argue that there is such an understanding and that Lewis has not provided any material for an argument against it. (shrink)

Extensively annotated, and including a biographical and critical Introduction to Hulme and his work, this is the first collected edition of the writings of the poet, critic, and philosopher T. E. Hulme.

An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.

The pioneering work of Edwin T. Jaynes in the field of statistical physics, quantum optics, and probability theory has had a significant and lasting effect on the study of many physical problems, ranging from fundamental theoretical questions through to practical applications such as optical image restoration. Physics and Probability is a collection of papers in these areas by some of his many colleagues and former students, based largely on lectures given at a symposium celebrating Jaynes' contributions, on the occasion of (...) his seventieth birthday and retirement as Wayman Crow Professor of Physics at Washington University. The collection contains several authoritative overviews of current research on maximum entropy and quantum optics, where Jaynes' work has been particularly influential, as well as reports on a number of related topics. In the concluding paper, Jaynes looks back over his career, and gives encouragement and sound advice to young scientists. All those engaged in research on any of the topics discussed in these papers will find this a useful and fascinating collection, and a fitting tribute to an outstanding and innovative scientist. (shrink)

Selected articles of Ēṭukūru Balarāmamūrti on Marxist philosophy; includes contributed on his life and work.

In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''congruence'' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises (...) the probabilityof a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemicjustification, or, to use Lewis's expression, ''rationaland practical reliance''.It turns out that, while thenegative thesis is essentially correct, astrong positive connection between congruence andprobability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimatelyneeds in his validation of memory – is contingent on thePrinciple of Indifference. In the final section we assess therepercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particularand for coherence justification in general. (shrink)

An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.

One of the most recent writers on the early history of Rome has shown that the framework of the traditional story is perhaps to be trusted, even though there are many details, inconsistent and self-contradictory, which are obviously to be rejected. In view of this fact, it might be worth while to reconsider the Coriolanus story, the prevailing opinion concerning which is that vouchsafed by Mommsen many years ago: ‘die Erzählung ist ein spät, in die Annalen eingefügtes, darum in alien (...) Stücken denselben ungleichartiges und widersprechendes Einschiebsel.’ The reasons for arriving at such an opinion are sufficiently obvious to warrant their receiving but the barest recital. First, it is incredible that the Volsci would either choose a renegade Roman to be their general, or, even if they did, allow him at the last minute to rob them of the fruits of victory. Secondly, inconsistencies in the version of the story which we possess induce us to suspect its historicity; for example, Dionysius of Syracuse is made to send corn to the starving Romans'—yet Dionysius lived some hundred years later; a youthful Coriolanus is represented as having considerable influence in the senate—yet in those early days the senate was essentially a gathering of venerable men; the Roman populace learns immediately the gist of Coriolanus' remarks in the senate—yet senate meetings were held in secret; Volsci are allowed to attend the ‘ludi’ and to meet at the Spring of Ferentina—yet in the fifth century none but Latini could do this; the Roman Marcius is given an honorific cognomen, Coriolanus, because of his behaviour at the capture of Corioli—yet such cognomina were not granted until the third century or even later and even then only to the general and not to the subordinate; the plebs is represented as wielding great power in the assembly1—yet we know that in the fifth century it did nothing of the kind. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that John Milton, in his tragedy Smason Agonistes, raises and offers a solution to a version of the problem of evil raised by Marilyn McCord Adams. Sections I and II are devoted to the presentation of Adams’s version of the problem and its place in the current discussion of the problem of evil. In section III, I present Milton’s version of the problem as it is raised in Samson Agonistes. The solution Milton offers to this (...) problem is taken up in section IV and examined in section V. Last, in section VI, I explore briefly the existential aspect of Milton’s solution. (shrink)

The author, a Brazilian physician and psychiatrist, draws on his wide experience to present a description of the behavior and motivations of man in his private, social, and political environment. Touching upon all important aspects of human experience, the work is unified by the common impress of a powerful, distinctive mind.--E. T.

It was Kronecker who sought to avoid the use in mathematics of all numbers other than the positive integers, and he outlined the means for carrying through this program. In the introductory sections of his memoir he briefly indicates the personal philosophy which made such a project appear desirable.

De Neys makes some useful points regarding dual-process models, but his critique ignores highly relevant theories of judgment from the persuasion literature. These persuasion models predate and often circumvent many of the criticisms he makes of the dual-process approaches he covers. Furthermore, the persuasion models anticipated some of the correctives to dual-process models that he proposes.

This article takes as its starting point the frequency with which Ovid refers to his earlier works in his Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto. Alongside his treatment of the Metamorphoses in the exile poetry, it is suggested that Ovid refers, on a number of occasions, to his Fasti and the progress he is making on it. He does so by using the incipit of his calendar poem, Tempora; this term is sometimes combined with signa (‘stars’), which are also mentioned in (...) the opening couplet of the Fasti. It is proposed that Ovid's attitude toward his Fasti changes over the course of his exile, during which time he is, at various junctures, editing his calendar, and that some of these changes are discernible in the exile poetry; they result in part from his entertaining the possibility of using his Fasti as leverage in securing a mitigation of his punishment. Poems discussed in detail are Tristia 1.1, 1.7, 2.547–52, 5.3; Epistulae ex Ponto 2.1, 4.8. (shrink)

With so much attention being paid to the development and refinement of appropriate criteria and tests for death, little attention has been given to the broader conceptual issues having to do with its definition or with the relation of a definition to its criterion. The task of selecting the correct criterion is, however, virtually impossible without proper attention to the broader conceptual setting in which the definition operates as the key feature. All of the issues I will discuss arise because (...) of this lack of concern with conceptual matters. Such problems as incorrectly diagnosing a patient as dead prior to the harvesting of his or her organs, defending the idea that death is reversible, and advocating a brainstem criterion of death, are all, I believe, errors that derive from this misplaced emphasis. (shrink)

Gendlin proposes experiential concepts as bridges between phenomenology and logical formulation. His method moves back and forth, aiming to increase both natural understanding and logical formulation. On thesubjective side, the concepts requiredirect reference tofelt orimplicit meaning. There is no equivalence between this and the logical side. Rather, in logical explication, the implicit iscarried forward, a relation shown by many functions. The subjective is no inner parallel. It performsspecific functions in language. Once these are located, they also lead to developments on (...) the formulated side.To show some of this, Gendlin modifies Lakoff and Johnson ''s theory of metaphor, and expands it into a theory of all language use. He denies that a metaphor consists of a pattern or image, shared by two situations. There is only one situation — the metaphoric one. The original situation is actually a family of many uses. As in all speech, a word makes sense only as its use-family crosses with an actual situation in the actual spot in a sentence. Subjectively, a metaphor means this crossing. From it, long chains of new similarities and differences can be generated. Ways to study the functions and features of thiscrossing are proposed. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of (...) science. (shrink)

The author tries to prove that hypnosis is a science to be used in everyday life. Hence his efforts to locate the lost body of a dead woman through hypnosis and the help of a very sensitive medium. The initial practical point of learning the whereabouts of the body gets lost however—the body is never found-in the course of his dialogues with the patient through whom he has contacted a "privileged soul" who lives close to the "Leader" in the highest (...) hierarchy of heaven. Mr. Ward attempts to provide simple answers to the great questions of life and death in an authoritative manner. Most of the book is in question and answer form with a final chapter of summary and conclusions. Altogether it is a naive exposition of a much disputed field.—E. O. T. (shrink)

The last Latin colony in Italy named by Livy is Aquileia; but Velleius Paterculus in a well-known passage says that Luca received a colony in 177 B.C., and follows his usual practice of not stating whether it was of the Latin or of the citizen type. Livy does not know of a colony at Luca, but does mention a citizen colony planted at Luna in 177 b.c.

A new edition of a work first published in 1926, in which Fr. Summers recounts the nature and the historical activities of the witch, "devotee of a loathly and obscene creed." One cannot doubt either the author's sincerity or his scholarship, evidenced by thorough documentation and a bibliography of 30 pages. A Forword by Felix Morrow compares the author's position with the more skeptical views of M. A. Murray.--E. T.

A revised, one-volume edition of Gandhi's account of his life and work up to 1921. The illuminating detail, the humility and humor of the author in contrast with the great events he shaped, combine to make an unforgettable book.--E. T.

An interpretation of Santayana's philosophy, organized around his preoccupation with art and aesthetics. Thorough and well-documented, the book offers an appreciation as well as a clear statement of Santayana's achievement.--E. T.

Earl R. MacCormick provides his readers with a survey of recent studies in the languages of science and religion arguing that both science and religion employ metaphors and that the one is as vulnerable as the other to attacks of meaninglessness on the grounds of verifiability and falsifiability criteria of meaning. While acknowledging that the contents and intentions of metaphors in science and religion differ, MacCormick argues that science and religion use metaphors for similar purposes and that both create myths (...) when they falsely attribute reality to what are in fact tentative explanations. His conclusion is that one cannot legitimately reject religious language as meaningless on the grounds that its language is metaphorical without recognizing that the language of science is subject to the same criticism. (shrink)

Acknowledging his indebtedness to Tillich, Bultmann, and Bonhoeffer, Dr. Smith reviews the changes in man's estimate of his own relation to history and Christianity, and describes a "new man" who can find God through other people and the community they comprise.--E. T.

Carruthers’proposals would seem to implicate language in what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 thinking (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and reasoning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that while Carruthers’characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-specific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to overlook the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that shows that (...) language and the explicit representations it supports are heavily involved in supporting System 1 thinking, but falls short of supporting his claim that it is the medium in which domain-general thinking occurs. (shrink)

Harper appeals to philosophy, literature, psychiatry and theology from Augustine to R. D. Laing to present what he calls a coherent picture of the major existential themes found in interior experience. This is not a book in existential philosophy in the usual sense. Indeed Harper argues that academic philosophers have failed to adequately treat interior experience. Interior experience, he says, is largely emotional and does not yield easily to analysis and conceptualization. Harper’s style is exploratory and suggestive, even lyrical at (...) points, as he interprets human experience in accordance with the themes: existence, insecurity, the void, self-isolation and presence. Human existence is, according to Harper, what I make it to be. Yet it is also characterized by insecurity or anxiousness, a sense of estrangement rather than fulfillment and reconciliation. The experience of contemporary man is characterized not only by insecurity but also by a sense of emotional and spiritual disability. God is absent and man experiences reality as indifferent and himself as alone and isolated in a void. Man is not, however, without hope for there is in existentialism and in personal experience the parallel theme of presence, being open to reality as grace, which gives hope of acceptance and love, satisfying the whole man. Harper’s study is scattered with references to Augustine, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Camus, Sartre and others. But these references are controlled from Harper’s own perspective, the result of his meditations on his own and other reports of interior experience. In the Afterword, Harper makes this perspective and his view of the nature of philosophy more clear.—E. T. L. (shrink)

Morality and the Inner Life is not a commentary on the Gorgias but a book which independently examines some of the themes from Plato’s dialogue. It does not attempt to understand the Gorgias as a whole or even to clarify some particular part of it. Indeed, one could read Morality and the Inner Life without ever learning that the theme of Plato’s dialogue is rhetoric. Rather, parts of the Gorgias are used as vehicles for the presentation of Dilman’s own reflections (...) about morality. His procedure is to extract various statements made in the course of Plato’s dialogue and then to offer his thoughts about the meaning they might be given and their truth or falsity. He examines such contentions as that virtue is knowledge, that the just man is the happy man, that punishment is a blessing for the wrongdoer, that justice is only a convention, and that no man does evil willingly. The procedure is justified by the argument that a "great philosopher" provides us with questions which we, too, must ask if we would be philosophers. (shrink)

Anecdotes from early Islamic history; includes moral of these stories reflecting on Islamic religious life and Islamic ethics.

Fritz Buri has been known to the English speaking world primarily as an existentialist theologian who took Bultmann’s program of demythologizing or existential interpretation to its radical conclusions and as a critic of Heidegger’s so-called meditative thinking of Being which, says Buri, provides no basis for critical theological reflection. The problem raised by demythologizing and by radical theology, says Hardwick, is finally one of language and meaning, a problem which he expresses in terms of the objective status of theological language. (...) Hardwick argues that while most contemporary theological options ignore or fail to come to grips with the dialectic between non-objectivity and objectivity, Buri’s position provides a dialectic in which he intends that the objectivity of theological discourse take account directly of the non-objectivity of religious faith. The question is whether Buri can accomplish his intention in such a way as to give content to the non-objectivity of the Christian faith. Buri attempts to assign positive meaning to the Christian message by talking of concrete possibilities for existing which can be revelatory to the extent that they are divested of their objectivity and understood as expressions of self-understanding. (shrink)

Although there have been a number of important studies of Karl Jaspers by European scholars, until recently there were in English only the Schilpp volume on Jaspers, brief studies by Allen and Lichtigfield, and a few articles scattered in journals and books. In 1968 Eugene Long published Jaspers and Bultmann. This was followed by three studies published during 1970-71: Charles Wallraff, Karl Jaspers ; Oswald Schrag, Existence, Existenz and Transcendence ; and Sebastian Samay, Reason Revisited. Ehrlich’s book is a welcome (...) addition to the study of Jaspers. Ehrlich was a student of Jaspers in Basel and apparently is devoted to his thought. The book is characterized by a thorough knowledge of the sources. It is a clear-headed discussion of Jaspers’ understanding of faith which takes readers into the central spirit of Jaspers’ philosophy, a spirit characterized by combativeness and openness in communication with others in search for the meaning and truth of human existence. Jaspers’ position is developed in the context of political and religious orthodoxies showing clearly the spirit of freedom and openness which is characteristic of Jaspers’ work. This topic permits the author to explore in detail the themes of communication, authority and tradition, and cipher language which are at the heart of all of Jaspers’ work. (shrink)

In his interpretation of Scheler’s Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Luther argues that although Scheler begins his analysis with an investigation of the phenomenon, sympathy, it is in fact the love phenomenon which is shown to be the more fundamental, and further, that Scheler’s clarification of the love phenomenon reveals a dynamic structure of Being. Scheler’s investigation is a phenomenological one, one intended not so much to demonstrate a thesis as to evoke a way of looking at the phenomena of (...) sympathy and love in order that one may understand descriptively what is being lived or experienced. According to Scheler man discovers himself as already in the world in relation to persons and things and thus sympathy and love are relational structures. Given this relatedness each term of a relation is meaningful only as a reference to the other and an analysis of one term independently of the other is an abstraction. Personal being is also within this relational unity and the most significant structure of this unity is said to be love or more concretely, "persons in love." According to Scheler a person is only in relatedness and while there are various levels at which this relatedness may be described Scheler is primarily concerned in Wesen und Formen to describe it at a metaphysical level where Being is said to disclose itself. (shrink)

Search for Gods is an exploration of man’s experiences in his natural and cultural world with the intent of rediscovering and describing the transcendent foundation of human existence which is said to be the ground of man’s freedom and his achievement of the fullness of his being-in-the-world. Writing from a Heideggerian perspective, Vycinas argues that the mythical world view, in which man is open to and takes part in transcendental reality, understood as the play of nature’s forces, was replaced in (...) Western thought and culture by an anthropocentric view in which man establishes his own world, and the transcendental is removed to the perimeter of the unreal. In the anthropocentric world, man understands the absence of the transcendental foundation to be a mark of his supremacy. But Vycinas holds that this is merely a phase in the cultural development of man and argues that when man meditates on his ways he will discover the insecurity of his ways and begin to search for foundations other than anthropocentric ones. (shrink)

Dupré argues that at the center of the cultural crisis of our time is an objectivist attitude, an attitude which results in thinking of human existence using models appropriate to objects with the result that transcendence is lost and man is thought of as a thing to be manipulated. However, a mere retreat into subjectivity is not the answer to this crisis. What is needed is reflection on the subject itself in order to give it a content of its own, (...) and Dupré suggests that a key to this kind of reflection is given in the work of Husserl and Heidegger. It is within the temporality and historicity of the being of man that man discovers his transcending of objectivist states and an openness to the divine, understood as other than an ultimate object separated from the self and opposed to it. Dupré’s brief and provocative book is primarily a series of reflections on the inner life of human existence, guided by critical reflection on the Judaeo-Christian tradition, in which he believes the inner transcendence of the self to have been articulated. It is the passive open character of man to which Dupré invites our particular attention, not the objectifying manipulating character, which is reflected prominently in our technological age. (shrink)